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Abstract 
Since 1979, China has made tremendous progress in its transformation to a socialist market 
economy. As part of this process, China’s financial system has evolved to one characterised 
by a high degree of marketization. At the same time, China today faces new challenges to 
growth and development, particularly from the necessity of restructuring its economy to 
focus increasingly on innovation and away from government led investment and low wage 
labour. In the context of digital financial services, China has been a late mover but this has 
changed dramatically in the past five years, to the point today where China is one of the 
major centres for digital financial services and financial technology (“fintech”). Looking 
forward, China needs to provide an appropriate regulatory basis for the future development of 
digital financial services and fintech, balancing growth and innovation with financial stability. 
China today is exhibiting signs of a last mover advantage in this respect that may see it 
leaping regulatory developments elsewhere. 
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1. Introduction 
The rise of digital financial services (DFS) over the past three decades is an important global 
phenomenon. Today, financial services is probably the most digitized industry, as well as the 
most globalized, in addition to being for at least the past two decades the single largest 
component of global technology spending.
1
 
In China, DFS developed much later than elsewhere, with major development only beginning 
in the late 1990s as the financial services sector modernized and developed in the context of 
the overall process of economic liberalization. Likewise, more recent developments in digital 
finance (such as internet payment services and peer-to-peer (P2P) lending) began to emerge 
only in the middle of the last decade. Innovations in DFS in China beyond internet banking 
and electronic payments are even more recent phenomenon, dating only from the beginning 
of this decade. Nevertheless, in many ways, China is experiencing a “last mover” advantage 
in the context of DFS and now appears to be developing more rapidly than most other 
jurisdictions. 
Many factors have contributed to this rapid development, including technological innovation, 
rapidly increasing use of digital devices and changing consumer behaviour, explosive growth 
of DFS providers, and the policy objective of the Chinese government to enhance financial 
inclusion via digital finance to support growth and encourage greater innovation. The 
significance of digital finance to the achievement of full financial inclusion has been firmly 
endorsed by the Chinese government. The expansion of financial inclusion for underserved 
segments, ranging from rural areas to the urban poor to (perhaps most importantly) non-state 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), has been one of the key elements of China’s 
financial sector reforms which in turn have been an integral element of China’s overall 
economic reform and innovation strategies.  
As well as promoting the development of digital finance, the Chinese government is now 
dedicated to establishing a regulatory framework to oversee and supervise DFS so as to 
ensure its healthy growth. The approach seeks to balance the needs for innovation and growth 
in the economy, particularly in relation to non-state firms and SMEs, with the requirements of 
financial stability. However, the regulatory efforts of the Chinese government have yet to 
lead to the establishment of a comprehensive framework, such that DFS remain under-
                                                          
1  See D. Arner, J. Barberis & R. Buckley, “FinTech: A New Post-crisis Paradigm?” (Sep. 2015). 
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regulated, and in some areas, unregulated in China. In particular, the rapid development of 
non-traditional forms of DFS such as non-bank electronic payments and P2P lending have 
often occurred prior to the establishment of a supporting regulatory framework, often to take 
advantage of gaps in existing legal and regulatory systems. With the release of a new policy 
framework in July 2015, the Chinese government is seeking to implement a strategically 
designed framework to balance the sometimes competing objectives of innovation, growth 
and financial stability. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of China’s financial 
sector reforms since 1978, including the early development and evolution of DFS. It 
highlights the lack of financial inclusion in China, a significant and longstanding issue which 
has attracted considerable government effort in the past decade. Despite these efforts, 
financial services for underserved sectors continues to be a major issue and a roadblock to 
future growth and innovation. Section 3 analyses the evolution of DFS over the past decade 
setting out various forms of digital finance provided by major internet and e-commerce 
companies, other non-financial institutions and banks. The section shows that the number and 
scale of digital finance providers has grown phenomenally since 2013, paralleling the 
increase in the acceptance of DFS by consumers in China.  
China’s regulatory framework for DFS can be divided into two periods: the initial period 
before 2015 and the development period since 2015. The initial period witnessed the 
promulgation of several rules by China’s banking regulators on certain types of digital 
finance such as internet payment and third-party payment services. While these rules 
contributed to the development of a regulatory framework on DFS, they are inadequate in 
many respects such as a lack of detailed and comprehensive provisions for the protection of 
consumers. Moreover, regulations of many other forms of digital finance will need to be 
developed. Since early 2015, there has been growing recognition, from both official and 
unofficial sources, that China needs to accelerate the development of DFS regulation with an 
aim to establish a preliminary regulatory framework by the end of 2015. On 18 July 2015, ten 
central government ministries and commissions jointly issued a Guideline on the Promotion 
of the Health Development of Internet Finance
2
 (2015 DFS Guideline). The Guideline 
clarified a number of important issues and addressed various types of DFS. Further, the 
                                                          
2 Guan Yu Cu Jin Hu Lian Wang Jin Rong Jian Kang Fa Zhan De Zhi Dao Yi Jian (Guideline on the Promotion of the 
Health Development of Internet Finance), promulgated on 18 July 2015. The Chinese official version of the Guideline is 
here: http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/zhengcefabu/201507/t20150720_1332370.htm   
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Guideline mandates the relevant authorities to develop detailed rules on the areas of digital 
finance for which they are responsible. The issuance of the Guideline, therefore, reflects a 
great effort and achievement of the Chinese government. Sections 4 and 5 thus offer a 
comprehensive study and analysis of China’s regulation of DFS by discussing, respectively, 
China’s DFS regulations before 2015 (section 4) and the 2015 DFS Guideline (section 5). 
These sections show that digital finance is considered by the Chinese government as being 
essential to achieve full financial inclusion, and that regulatory efforts have been made to 
ensure the healthy development of DFS. Section 6 concludes, arguing that China is now on 
the verge of moving from last mover to first mover in respect of both DFS and its regulation. 
2. The Modern Evolution of China’s Financial Sector Reforms 
As one of the central elements of China’s economic reforms since 1978, the modern 
evolution of China’s financial sector reforms can be divided into four stages.3 
The first stage encompassed 1978-1990, in which the foundational transformation of China’s 
financial system from one of central planning and control was commenced. Most 
significantly, in this period, four state-owned banks – Bank of China (BOC), China 
Construction Bank (CCB), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China (ICBC) (known as the “Big Four”) – were established to take over the 
commercial banking businesses of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC); and the PBOC 
formally assumed the role of China’s central bank. Also established in this period were 
various other financial institutions or intermediaries such as regional commercial banks in 
designated areas, Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) which provide banking services in rural 
areas, Urban Credit Cooperatives (UCCs) as the counterpart of RCCs serving urban areas, 
and investment and trust companies. These institutions mainly operated to supplement the 
lending activities of the “Big Four” with a focus on areas (such as rural areas) and borrowers 
                                                          
3  The description of the first three phases of China’s financial reforms (i.e. 1978-2013) is mainly based on Maria M.N. 
DaCosta & Jennifer P.N. Foo, “China’s Financial System: Two Decades of Gradual Reforms” (2002)28(10) Managerial 
Finance 3-18 at 4-5; Franklin Allen, Jun Qian & Meijun Qian, “China’s Financial System: Past, Present, and Future” in 
Loren Brandt & Thomas G. Rawski (eds) China’s Great Economic Transformation (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) 506-568 at 509-511; Patrick Hess, “China’s Financial System: Past Reforms, Future Ambitions and Current 
State” in F., Rövekamp& H.G., Hilpert(eds) Currency Cooperation in East Asia (Springer, 2014) 21-41 at 25-29; Peter 
Sparreboom & Eric Duflos, “Financial Inclusion in the People’s Republic of China: An Analysis of Existing Research 
and Public Data”, CGAP and Working Group on Inclusive Finance in China, China Papers on Inclusiveness No.7 
(August 2012) 1-45. For a comprehensive analysis of China’s financial reforms especially the reforms of the banking 
sector before 1998, see Nicholas R. Lardy, China’s Unfinished Economic Revolution (Washington D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 1998).  
Page 6 of 39 
 
(such as non-state owned enterprises) with limited access to the state-owned banks.
4
 Despite 
these reforms and developments, the lack of financial inclusion in China was significant 
given the highly-controlled banking system in which investment, lending and interest rate 
policies excessively skewed towards state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and designated priority 
sectors.
5
 These policies also caused other glaring and longstanding problems in China’s 
financial sector such as inefficient allocation of resources, lack of profitability and 
competitiveness, and mounting non-performing loans (NPLs).
6
 
The second stage from 1991 to 2005 was built upon a comprehensive and bold reform 
strategy designed by the then Premier Zhu Rongji and PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan. 
This period saw a range of financial reforms with the most significant being, first, the 
restructuring, commercialization and eventual listing of the “Big Four” in order to enhance 
their efficiency and profitability and tackle issues such as NPLs; second, the transformation 
of other financial intermediaries especially RCCs to improve viability and governance; third, 
the creation and development of China’s bond and stock markets, with the establishment in 
particular of the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1990 and the 
PBOC interbank bond market; and fourth, China’s gradual opening-up of its market for 
foreign financial institutions following its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 2001. This period also saw the establishment of the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) in 1992, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) in 1998, 
and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2003, removing banking 
regulation from the PBOC. The establishment of the major regulators and their supporting 
legislative frameworks thus formed the core components of China’s financial regulatory 
system, necessary to support financial reform and economic growth while maintaining 
financial stability. These reforms also led to the closure of non-bank financial intermediaries 
so as to allow the government to “increase its control over monetary flows” and protection of 
depositors.
7
 Investment and loan policies in favour of SOEs remained in place.
8
 As a result, 
                                                          
4  See above n 3, Lardy, China’s Unfinished Economic Revolution, at 61-76. 
5  See above n 3, Sparreboom & Duflos, “Financial Inclusion in the People’s Republic of China”, at 7-8. For a discussion 
of China’s interest rate policy reforms during this period, see Alexander Ballantyne, Jonathan Hambur, Ivan Roberts and 
Michelle Wright, “Financial Reform in Australia and China”, Reserve Bank of Australia Research Discussion Paper 
2014-10, 1-42 at 23-25. 
6  See above n 3, Lardy, China’s Unfinished Economic Revolution, at 76-127; Sparreboom & Duflos, “Financial Inclusion 
in the People’s Republic of China”, at 8. 
7  See above n 3, Sparreboom & Duflos, “Financial Inclusion in the People’s Republic of China”, at 9. 
8  Ibid., at 10. 
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the state of financial inclusion deteriorated during this period due to the reduced access to 
financial services in rural areas and for non-state owned enterprises especially SMEs.
9
   
The third stage was 2005-2013 which was characterized by Hess as China’s fading period of 
financial reforms due to the change of leadership and the growing power of conservatives in 
the government.
10
 However, there were a number of significant developments during this 
period. First, the PBOC eventually lifted the restrictions on lending interest rates in 2013 and 
proposed to liberalize deposit rates by 2016.
11
 Second, the Chinese government continued to 
liberalize China’s exchange rate regime which led to significant and steady appreciation of 
the RMB.
12
 Third, efforts to improve the health of financial institutions especially the state-
owned banks continued and have led to great achievements including, amongst others, 
significant reductions of NPLs and improvement of capital adequacy, improved internal 
governance and management in line with recognized international standards, and increasing 
diversity of businesses of both banks and non-bank financial institutions.
13
 Fourth, in line 
with the central policy goal to “build a harmonious society”, the government committed to 
improve financial inclusion with an ultimate goal to achieve “full banking service 
coverage”.14 To achieve this, central and local governments took steps to increase the number 
of conventional financial institutions and the diversity of financial services which 
significantly improved financial accessibility in rural areas and for SMEs.
15
 Further, various 
new types of microfinance emerged and developed in this period such as P2P lending, 
microcredit companies, village banks, etc.
16
 The expansion of financial inclusion supported 
by government policies has led some observers to characterise this period of reforms as 
China’s “evolution of financial inclusion”. 17  Most significantly, this period witnessed 
explosive growth in China’s shadow banking market, in particular wealth management and 
related structured products designed to avoid lending and interest rate restrictions in China’s 
                                                          
9  Ibid., at 10-11. 
10  See above n 3, Hess, “China’s Financial System: Past Reforms, Future Ambitions and Current State”, at 28-29.  
11  See above n 5, Ballantyne et al., “Financial Reform in Australia and China”, at 30.  
12  See above n 5, Ballantyne et al., “Financial Reform in Australia and China”, at 33-34; Ross Buckley and Weihuan Zhou, 
“Navigating Adroitly: China’s Interaction with the Global Trade, Investment, and Financial Regimes” (2014)9(1) 
University of Pennsylvania East Asia Law Review 1-40 at 32. 
13  Richard Herd, Samuel Hill and Charles Pigott, “China’s Financial Sector Reforms”, OECD Economics Department 
Working Papers No.747 (ECO/WKP(2010)3), 1-46 at 1-11.  
14  See above n 3, Sparreboom & Duflos, “Financial Inclusion in the People’s Republic of China”, at 13. 
15  See above n 3, Sparreboom & Duflos, “Financial Inclusion in the People’s Republic of China”, at 16-21. For a 
comprehensive study of the development of microfinance in China, see “Microfinance in China” published by World 
Microfinance Forum Geneva in 2010 which consists of a number of articles on China’s microfinance, available at:  
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/library/microfinance-china-0  
16  See Du Xiaoshan, “The Current Supply of Microfinance Services in China”, World Microfinance Forum Geneva 
(January 2008), available at: http://www.microfinancegateway.org/library/current-supply-microfinance-services-china; 
above n 3, Sparreboom & Duflos, “Financial Inclusion in the People’s Republic of China”, at 21. 
17  See above n 3, Sparreboom & Duflos, “Financial Inclusion in the People’s Republic of China”, at 12.  
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banking sector but also to provide access to finance to underserved non-state firms, including 
SMEs. It is also during this period that most financial institutions in China began significant 
development of DFS, in particular internet banking and electronic payments services 
necessary to support the growth and development of the economy and to serve increasingly 
sophisticated consumer needs. This period also included the global financial crisis of 2008 
and a return to state direction of credit in support of the economy while seeking to restrain 
excessive growth of property lending and prices. 
The fourth period from 2013 witnessed a renewed focus on financial reform and 
liberalization and the wave of digital finance currently reshaping China’s financial market. It 
has been observed that 2013 was probably the year that heralded a new phase of financial 
reforms in China.
18
 The drive for reform and liberalisation has included major initiatives to 
increase the international use of the RMB, to end interest rate controls, to liberalize capital 
movements and to increase China’s overseas investment, particularly in the context of the 
One Belt, One Road initiative. Regulatory reforms have also proceeded on a range of fronts. 
In 2014, Chinese regulators licensed 5 private banks (including 2 internet-based banks) and 
approved the establishment of “13 privately-controlled financial leasing companies, 
consumer finance companies and finance companies affiliated to corporate groups, and 162 
village and township banks with private sector taking dominant shares.”19 In May 2015, the 
formal deposit insurance system was established.
20
 These reflect the continuing efforts of the 
Chinese government to liberalise the financial sector and to enhance financial inclusion by 
increasing the number of non-state owned financial services providers to serve underbanked 
segments. At the same time, non-traditional forms of digital finance have grown very rapidly 
in a very short time in China, bringing major challenges to policymakers and regulators. With 
the release of the 2015 DFS Guideline, the Chinese government has committed to developing 
a comprehensive regulatory framework on DFS to ensure its sustainable development, 
balancing the objectives of support for innovation, growth and inclusion with financial 
stability. The evolution and regulation of DFS in China will be discussed in detail below. 
                                                          
18 For example, China Industry Research Network characterised the year of 2013 as “Year One of China’s Internet Finance 
Era”, see http://www.chinairn.com/news/20131231/120642562.html (in Chinese) 
19  See Financial Stability Analysis Group of the PBOC, “China Financial Stability Report 2015” (May 2015) at 31, 
available at: http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/959/index.html   
20 Cun Kuan Bao Xian Tiao Li (Regulation on Deposit Insurance), promulgated by the State Council Decree No. 660 on 17 
February 2015, effective on 1 May 2015. Chinese official version available at: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-
03/31/content_9562.htm  
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In contrast with China’s fast growing economy and increasingly deeper economic reforms, its 
financial system reforms have progressed much more slowly.
21
 Despite the substantial 
improvement of the stability, profitability and inclusiveness of the financial sector, the sector 
continues to be predominantly state-owned and hence more policy-oriented than market-
oriented, a characteristic reinforced both by the state-directed increase in lending in the wake 
of the global financial crisis and recently by the state intervention in the stock market during 
2015. The longstanding issues of inefficiency, un-competiveness and vulnerability of China’s 
financial sector remain to be resolved, and a fully market-based financial system will unlikely 
be established in a short period of time, if ever.
 22
 In the view of some observers, the 
inadequate reforms of, and the unresolved problems in, China’s financial sector have made 
the sector “one of the weakest links in the economy” that may “hamper future economic 
growth” of China.23 
In respect of financial inclusion, despite the various policies promoting financial services 
coverage in underserved segments
24
, the lack of financial inclusion is likely to continue given 
the bias of banks towards state-run companies and designated sectors.
25
 More significantly, 
the potential size of the Chinese market means the number of financial institutions and the 
types of financial services offered are far from adequate such that there are still large 
numbers of rural population, non-state firms, SMEs and sectors that do not have full and 
favourable access to financial services.
26
 Accordingly, the development of non-bank financial 
institutions and new ways and forms of finance to support the establishment and growth of 
underserved entities and sectors is crucial for China to further improve financial inclusion 
and “to have a stable and functioning banking system in the future”. 27 This will in turn propel 
China’s transition to a market-based financial system and overall economic reforms and 
growth.
28
 
                                                          
21 See above n 3, DaCosta & Foo, “China’s Financial System: Two Decades of Gradual Reforms”, at 3; Hess, “China’s 
Financial System: Past Reforms, Future Ambitions and Current State” at 22; Lardy, China’s Unfinished Economic 
Revolution, at 16-17.  
22 See above n 3, Hess, “China’s Financial System: Past Reforms, Future Ambitions and Current State” at 29-33.  
23 See above n 3, Allen, Qian & Qian, “China’s Financial System: Past, Present, and Future”, at 506. 
24 See, for example, above n 13, Herd, Hill & Pigott, “China’s Financial Sector Reforms”, at 27-32.  
25 See above n 3, Sparreboom & Duflos, “Financial Inclusion in the People’s Republic of China”, at 27-29. 
26   See He Guangwen, “An Analysis of Microfinance Demand in China”, World Microfinance Forum Geneva (February 
2008), available at: http://www.microfinancegateway.org/library/analysis-microfinance-demand-china; China 
Association of Microfinance, “A Glimpse at the Microfinance Industry in China”, World Microfinance Forum Geneva 
(May 2008), available at: http://www.microfinancegateway.org/library/glimpse-microfinance-industry-china.   
27 See above n 3, Allen, Qian & Qian, “China’s Financial System: Past, Present, and Future”, at 531-532. 
28 See Joanna Ledgerwood, Julie Earne and Candace Nelson (eds), “The New Microfinance Handbook: A Financial Market 
System Perspective” (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2013) at 1-2. (Recognising various benefits of financial 
inclusion and its contributions to economic growth and stability)  
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3. The Evolution of Digital Financial Services in China 
DFS refer to the delivery of financial services through technologies such as mobile 
telephones, the internet and other electronic devices and channels.
 29
 Innovative forms of 
digital finance are being increasingly introduced in financial markets around the world.
30
 As 
is now widely accepted, DFS has great potential to promote financial inclusion given its 
accessibility and affordability and the large and rapidly increasing number of mobile and 
internet users worldwide.
31
 In addition, DFS may well have other positive spillover effects, 
such as promotion of technological innovation and creation of employment opportunities, 
which will foster economic growth.
32
  
Another driving force behind the DFS boom in China has been financial repression. Since the 
commencement of the process of economic reform, China strictly controlled interest rates of 
financial institutions to reduce loan costs of SOEs and promote investment.
33
 Both deposit 
and lending interest rates were virtually fixed at levels significantly below market levels
34
 
until recently when the government liberalized the lending rate in late 2013 while 
maintaining controls over the deposit rate. The interest rates restrictions created difficulties 
for private firms to obtain loans from banks due to the shortage of deposits from 
households.
35
 This, in turn, led to strong demands of private firms for other sources of finance 
and consumers for other channels of investment. The mismatch between these demands and 
the inadequate supply by traditional financial institutions has provided a fertile ground for the 
growth of digital finance.
36
 As will be shown below, as non-financial institutions particularly 
internet finance providers were not subject to the interest rates restrictions, they offered 
higher deposit rates than those offered by banks to attract investment by consumers.  
The boom in DFS has created various challenges for governments. The most imminent 
challenge has been the need for balanced regulatory frameworks which allow for the 
                                                          
29  See, for example, Alliance for Financial Inclusion, “Digital Financial Services”, available at: http://www.afi-
global.org/policy-areas/digital-financial-services  
30  See above n 29, “Digital Financial Services”; Kate Lauer & Timothy Lyman, “Digital Financial Inclusion”, CGAP (10 
March 2015), at 1, available at: http://www.cgap.org/publications/digital-financial-inclusion   
31 See Anita Gardeva & Elisabeth Rhyne, “Opportunities and Obstacles to Financial Inclusion: Survey Report”, Center for 
Financial Inclusion (2011), at 11-12, available at: http://www.centerforfinancialinclusion.org/publications-a-
resources/browse-publications/205; above n 30, Lauer & Lyman, “Digital Financial Inclusion”, at 1.   
32  See The World Bank, “Digital Finance: Empowering the Poor via New Technologies” (10 April 2014), available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/04/10/digital-finance-empowering-poor-new-technologies  
33  See above n 5, Ballantyne et al., “Financial Reform in Australia and China”, at 24-25. 
34  Bo Hu, “Financial Repression and Interest Rate Liberalization in China”, conference paper (April 2014), at 2, available 
at https://economics.indiana.edu/home/conferences/2014-jordan-river-economics-conference/files/2014-05-02-05.pdf  
35  Ibid.  
36  Tjun Tang, Yue Zhang & David He, “The Rise of Digital Finance in China: New Drivers, New Game, New Strategy”, 
The Boston Consulting Group (October 2014) at 5-6.  
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sustainable development of DFS while providing necessary oversight and supervision to 
ensure financial stability, the protection of consumers and the regulation of issues such as 
money laundering.
37
 Full digital financial inclusion requires cooperation among all of the 
players involved such as banks, non-bank digital finance providers, mobile network operators, 
internet platform providers and other agents, and requires each player to operate in 
accordance with laws and professional standards and in good faith.
38
 In addition, for DFS to 
unleash its full potential, digital infrastructure (such as payment systems, digital platforms 
and channels), electronic devices and DFS applications must be made accessible and 
affordable to consumers.
39
   
3.1 Evolution of Traditional DFS 
Conventional financial institutions, which remain the dominant players in China’s financial 
market, have been active in creating DFS platforms.  
The first ATM in China was introduced by the BOC in 1987 along with the bank’s first ATM 
card ‘Great Wall ATM Card’.40 Since then, China has been at the forefront of development of 
the ATM market.
41
 For the last decade, in response to the policy directive to enhance 
financial inclusion, Chinese banks have endeavoured to increase the number of banking 
facilities including ATMs especially in rural areas.
42
 By 2013, ATMs in China had soared to 
520,000, making China the largest ATM market in the world.
43
 In addition, China has 
focussed on the development of advanced technology for ATMs. In May 2015, China 
launched the world’s first facial recognition ATM which includes other high-tech functions 
such as counterfeit bill recognition and high-speed bank note handling.
 44
  
                                                          
37  See Louise Malady & Ross Buckley, “The Regulation of Mobile Money in Emerging Markets: State of Play”, research 
funded by CIFR, UNCDF, Standard Chartered Bank and UNSW, 30 April 2014, available at: 
http://www.clmr.unsw.edu.au/resource/risk/regulation-of-mobile-money/regulatory-state-play-april-2014   
38 See above n 30, Lauer & Lyman, “Digital Financial Inclusion”, at 1-2. 
39  See above n 36, Tang, Zhang & He, “The Rise of Digital Finance in China”, at 13-27.  
40  ResearchInChina, “China ATM (Automatic Teller Machine) Market Report, 2008”, August 2008, at 1, available at: 
http://www.researchinchina.com/FreeReport/PdfFile/633879276546958750.pdf; Bank of China, “China’s First ATM 
Card”, available at: http://www.boc.cn/en/aboutboc/ab5/200811/t20081119_1602016.html  
41  See above n 40, ResearchInChina, “China ATM (Automatic Teller Machine) Market Report, 2008”, at 4.   
42  See above n 3, Sparreboom & Duflos, “Financial Inclusion in the People’s Republic of China”, at 16. 
43  RBR, “China overtakes USA as world’s largest ATM market”, Press Release (20 June 2014), available at: 
http://www.rbrlondon.com/about/ATMs_China_2014_Press_Release_200614.pdf.  
44  Jason Hahn, “The World’s First ATM with Facial Recognition Technology is Unveiled to the Public in China”, Digital 
Trends (31 May 2015), available at: http://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/the-worlds-first-atm-with-facial-
recognition-technology-is-unveiled-to-the-public-in-china/  
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In contrast, in e-payments (such as online and mobile payments), China was a late mover 
with its nationwide interbank network only being established in 2002.
45
 However, the 
development of e-payments in China has been phenomenal since 2006 when the PBOC rolled 
out the Bulk Electronic Payment System to the whole country.
 46
 For example, in 2012, major 
Chinese commercial banks “saw more than 100 percent growth in mobile banking users … 
and more than 300 percent growth in mobile transaction value.”47 The value and volume of 
online payments reached RMB 1060.78 trillion and 23.674 billion respectively by 2013, 
representing an annual increase of 28.89 percent and 23.06 percent respectively.
48
 In 2014, 
the increases were even more rapidly with a total of RMB 8.41 trillion mobile payment 
transactions (a year-on-year (y-o-y) increase of 655.51 percent), RMB 1376.02 trillion online 
payment transactions by banking institutions (a y-o-y increase of 29.72%), and RMB 16.21 
trillion online payment transactions by payment institutions (a y-o-y increase of 75.5 
percent).
49
  
Internet banking was introduced in China by the BOC in 1996, and quickly adopted by the 
other major state-owned and privately-owned banks between 1997 and 2002.
50
 Since 2002, 
the number of internet banking users has increased rapidly.
51
 By 2012, personal and corporate 
internet banking transactions had replaced more than 50 percent of over-the-counter 
transactions in China, with a replacement rate higher than 85 percent at some banks.
52
 In 
2014, China Minsheng Bank, the largest privately-owned commercial bank in China, 
launched its Direct Banking platform to move all of its standardised bank products and 
transactions online.
53
 Minsheng Bank’s entry into Direct Banking was quickly followed by 
the state-owned banks and other jointly-owned banks.
54
 This signalled a historic move of 
China’s major banks into the digital finance era such that, predictions are now being made 
                                                          
45  Arlyss Gease & Joan Qiu, “China 20/20: The Future of Mobile Payment in China”, Maverick China Research 
(December 2012), at 4, available at: http://www.maverickchina.com/reports/china-20-20-whitepapers  
46  Ibid. Also see China UnionPay, “Brief  Review on the Development of China’s Payment System”, undated, available at: 
http://en.unionpay.com/merchantService/knowledge/file_4420451.html (describing the Bulk Electronic Payment System 
as the “public platform for financial institutions and payment and settlement organizations in the banking industry to 
develop creative payment services and extend service functions”) 
47  See Leesa Shrader and Eric Duflos, “China: A New paradigm in Branchless Banking”, CGAP (March 2014), at 37. 
48  See Financial Stability Analysis Group of the PBOC, “China Financial Stability Report 2014” (April 2014) at 116, 
available at: http://www.centerforfinancialstability.org/fsr/chn_fsr_201407.pdf  
49  See above n 19, PBOC, “China Financial Stability Report 2015”, at 123.   
50    Xina Yuan, “Present and Future of Internet Banking in China” (2010)15(1) Journal of Internet Banking and Commerce 
1-10 at 3.     
51    Ibid., at 4.     
52  See above n 36, Tang, Zhang & He, “The Rise of Digital Finance in China”, at 32.   
53  See above n 36, Tang, Zhang & He, “The Rise of Digital Finance in China”, at 4.   
54  See Wu Hongyuran, “Minsheng Bank is Latest to Join E-Commerce Fray”, Caixin online (23 August 2013), available at: 
http://english.caixin.com/2013-08-23/100573307.html; Li Xiaoxiao & Liu Caiping, “Banks Trying Direct Route to 
Online Future”, Caixin online (22 January 2015), available at: http://english.caixin.com/2015-01-22/100777224.html     
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that “direct banks will take more than 10% market share of the retail banking industry (in 
China) by 2020”.55 
In addition, to promote the internationalization of the RMB, the PBOC has been actively 
seeking cooperation with central banks or relevant authorities in various countries or 
territories to realise RMB settlement of international transactions (e.g. trade and investment) 
through the RMB Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system.
56
 The first such arrangement 
was concluded by the PBOC with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority in July 2010, and then 
expanded into Taiwan in August 2012, Singapore in February 2013, the UK in June 2014, 
South Korea in July 2014, and Australia in November 2014.
57
 
3.2 Evolution of Non-Traditional DFS 
The explosive growth in numbers and scale of non-traditional DFS start-ups since 2013 has 
already begun to reshape China’s financial system.58  Riding the wave of the increasing 
adoption of new technologies
59
, a number of major digital finance providers have propelled 
the development of DFS in China. 
The pioneer and leading non-traditional DFS provider in China is the Alibaba Group. As the 
world’s largest e-commerce company, the group has developed many influential digital 
finance products.
60
 The most significant are:  
 Alipay61, Alibaba’s third-party online payment platform launched in December 2004, 
is the largest and most popular online payment service in China with “more than 300 
                                                          
55  See Hua Zhang, “China’s Direct Banks: Birth of a New Banking Sector”, CELENT (5 January 2015), available at: 
http://www.celent.com/reports/chinas-direct-banks-birth-new-banking-sector      
56  SWIFT, “RMB Internationalisation: Implications for the Global Financial Industry”, White Paper (2011), available at: 
http://www.swift.com/assets/swift_com/documents/products_services/RMB_White_paper_internationalisation.pdf  
57  Saikat Chatterjee & Tomasz Janowski, “Factbox: Development of China’s Yuan Payment Systems”, REUTERS (8 July 
2014), available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/08/us-china-economy-yuan-idUSKBN0FD2GL20140708; 
Australian Securities Exchange & Bank of China, “ASX and Bank of China to Expand Cooperation: Bank of China 
Appointed RMB Clearing Bank”, Media Release (19 November 2014), available at: 
http://www.asx.com.au/documents/asx-news/asx-welcomes-bank-of-china-as-rmb-clearing-bank.pdf     
58  Generally see above n 36, Tang, Zhang & He, “The Rise of Digital Finance in China”, at 1-11. For a more detailed 
overview of the development of DFS in China, see Financial Stability Analysis Group of the PBOC, “China Financial 
Stability Report 2014” (April 2014) at 171-176, available at: 
http://www.centerforfinancialstability.org/fsr/chn_fsr_201407.pdf  
59 See above n 47, Shrader & Duflos, “China: A New paradigm in Branchless Banking”, at 6-8. 15-17. For a 
comprehensive report on China’s internet coverage and digital development, see Jonathan Woetzel, et al., “China’s 
Digital Transformation: The Internet’s Impact on Productivity and Growth”, McKinsey Global Institute (July 2014). 
60 For an overview of the business of the Alibaba Group, see Leesa Shrader, “Microfinance, E-Commerce, Big Data and 
China: The Alibaba Story”, CGAP (11 October 2013), available at: http://www.cgap.org/blog/microfinance-e-
commerce-big-data-and-china-alibaba-story   
61  For an introduction of Alipay and its associated products, see http://ab.alipay.com/i/jieshao.htm#en. 
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million registered users in China (and 17 million overseas)” by October 2014.62 It 
“handles more than 80 million transactions daily” and had settled 42.3 billion 
payments by December 2014.
63
 As one of the most fundamental and fastest growing 
products of Alibaba, Alipay is viewed as forming “the core of Alibaba’s internet 
finance ecosystem”.64     
 AliFinance, one of the pilot financial products launched by Alibaba in 2011, provides 
micro-loans to vendors registered on Alibaba and TaoBao platforms.
 65
 This product is 
aimed at serving SMEs and sole proprietors which have difficulties in obtaining loans 
from banks. The product allows all transactions to be done online and provides 
flexible repayment terms. While individual loan amounts are small, the aggregate 
scale of AliFinance loans is not insignificant given the large number of registered 
users with Alibaba and TaoBao. For example, the Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor (CGAP) reported that by October 2013 AliFinance had “409,444 borrowers 
spanning the country with an outstanding portfolio of 105 billion RMB ($17.2 
billion).”66 Although AliFinance’s market share remains marginal (i.e. around 0.1% of 
the total loans issued by China’s banks), 67 it is a successful example of digital lending 
targeting underbanked customers and has continued to grow. More recently, 
AliFinance appears to have been replaced by Ant Credit, a new digital finance product 
of Alibaba aiming at providing micro loans to SMEs and individuals.
 
Partnering with 
the International Finance Corporation, a member of the World Bank Group, Ant 
Credit launched the “first Internet-based gender-finance program in China” on 27 
January 2015 committing to “expand financing for women entrepreneurs”.68  
 Alipay introduced Yu’e Bao and its associated mobile application “Alipay Wallet” in 
June 2013. Yu’e Bao is essentially an online money market fund in which Alipay 
customers can deposit money left in their Alipay accounts and earn interest at rates 
                                                          
62  See Christina Larson, “Alipay Leads a Digital Finance Revolution in China”, MIT Technology Review (26 January 
2015), available at: http://www.technologyreview.com/news/534001/alipay-leads-a-digital-finance-revolution-in-china/  
63  See Alibaba Group, “Alipay 2014 Spending Report Sheds Light on Chinese Online Spending Behavior”, Press Release 
(8 December 2014), available at: http://www.alibabagroup.com/en/news/article?news=p141208   
64  See Matthias Hendrichs, “Why Alipay is more than just the Chinese equivalent of Paypal”, TECHINASIA (3 August 
2015), available at: https://www.techinasia.com/talk/online-payment-provider-alipay-chinese-equivalent-paypal/   
65 See above n 60, Shrader, “Microfinance, E-Commerce, Big Data and China: The Alibaba Story”. AliFinance’s official 
website is here: http://view.1688.com/cms/info/loan/2010/xinxibaoguang/01.html (in Chinese). 
66  See above n 60, Shrader, “Microfinance, E-Commerce, Big Data and China: The Alibaba Story”.  
67  Simon Rabinovitch, “Alibaba Digs Deep for Chinese Banking Treasure”, Financial Times (25 August 2013), available at 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f956b004-ffee-11e2-9c40-00144feab7de.html#axzz3emowunHf .  
68  See Susan Wang, “China’s Women Entrepreneurs Targeted for Small-Business Loans”, Alizila (27 January 2015), 
available at: http://www.alizila.com/chinas-women-entrepreneurs-targeted-small-business-loans  
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generally much higher than those offered by banks.
69
 Yu’e Bao does not require 
minimum deposits and allows withdrawal at any time.
70
 In addition, as “up to 90 
percent of Yu’e Bao funds are invested in interbank deposits at 29 large banks, 
including the big state-owned ones”, investment in Yu’e Bao is secure.71 With these 
advantages compared to conventional financial products, Yu’e Bao has quickly 
become China’s largest online money market fund 72  and the fourth largest 
worldwide.
73
 After only one year, Yu’e Bao had 100 million investors and RMB 570 
billion (or more than $90 billion) assets under management.
74
 
 In March 2014, Alibaba launched an entertainment crowdfunding scheme to be 
operated under Yu’e Bao letting users “spend between 100 yuan ($16.13) and 1,000 
yuan ($161.3) to invest in popular films” and games.75 The promotion attracted more 
than 240,000 users in two days of operation and was expected to continue to grow 
given the size of China’s market for cultural products.76  
 In late 2014, Alibaba restructured its major digital finance businesses such as Ant 
Credit, Alipay, Ali Wallet, and Yu’e Bao by placing all of the businesses under Ant 
Financial Services Group (Ant Financial) which became Alibaba’s key digital finance 
provider.
77
 With the consolidated businesses, Ant Financial aims to bring finance to 
SMEs, individuals and other underserved segments via internet-based solutions and 
technology, and to work with other financial institutions “to create a new financial 
ecosystem” in China. 78 For example, via its digital finance platforms, Ant Financial 
has successfully expanded digital financial inclusion in underdeveloped rural areas 
                                                          
69 For a good introduction of Yu’e Bao, see Moran Zhang, “Alibaba’s Online Money Market Fund Yu’E Bao: 8 Things 
You Need To Know”, International Business Times (11 March 2014), available at: http://www.ibtimes.com/alibabas-
online-money-market-fund-yue-bao-8-things-you-need-know-1560601. The official website of Yu’E Bao is here: 
https://bao.alipay.com/yeb/index.htm (in Chinese). 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid.  
73 See above n 36, Tang, Zhang & He, “The Rise of Digital Finance in China”, at 4.   
74 Ibid.  
75 Clifford Coonan, “China’s Alibaba Launches Crowdfunding-Like Service for Film Investment”, The Hollywood 
Reporter (1 April 2014), available at:  http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/china-s-alibaba-launches-crowdfunding-
692910; Neil Gough, “Alibaba to Make Movies With Crowdfunding Idea”, The New York Times (26 March 2014), 
available at:  
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/26/alibaba-enters-the-movie-business-with-a-kind-of-crowdfunding/?_r=0   
76 Ibid.  
77 See Alibaba Group, “Official Launch of Ant Financial Services Group Brings New Financial Ecosystem to China”, Press 
Release (16 October 2014), available at: http://www.alibabagroup.com/en/news/article?news=p141016.   
78 Ibid.  
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and has committed to continue to do so by building more digital finance infrastructure 
and channels in these areas.
79
  
 In June 2015, Alibaba opened its internet bank called MYbank to offer loans of up to 
RMB 5 million (or $800,000) to SMEs.
80
 MYbank was one of the private banks 
approved by the Chinese government in 2014; the first one approved was Tencent’s 
WeBank (which will be considered below). MYbank is 30 percent owned by Ant 
Financial, with the other shareholders being China’s major private companies Fosun 
Group and Wanxiang Group.                
Alibaba’s stunning success in DFS has stimulated other internet giants and conventional 
financial institutions in China to rush into the digital financial market by offering similar 
digital financial products. 
Tencent is one of the oldest and largest internet social-networking and entertainment 
companies in China currently having more than 1 billion users registered with its massively 
popular messaging products QQ and WeChat.
81
 Listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
since 2004, Tencent’s market value reached $206 billion in April 2015, exceeding that of 
Oracle ($190 billion), Amazon ($178 billion) and IBM ($161 billion).
 82
 Tenpay, Tencent’s 
online payment product providing B2B, B2C and C2C payment services, is China’s second 
largest online payment platform after Alipay.
83
 During China’s 2014 Spring Festival, Tencent 
launched another innovative online product named “Red Envelope”, tailored to the Festival 
traditions. It allows customers to give lucky money or red packets to family members and 
close friends via WeChat.
84
 Two days after its launch, the promotion attracted more than 5 
million users exchanging over 20 million envelopes.
85
 The digital “Red Envelope” carried on 
its success to the 2015 Spring Festival witnessing the exchange of 1 billion virtual red 
                                                          
79 See Susan Wang, “Ant Financial Brings Biz Loans, Investment Products to Rural China”, Alizila (17 March 2015), 
available at: http://www.alizila.com/ant-financial-brings-biz-loans-investment-products-rural-china   
80 See The Australian, “China’s Alibaba launches internet bank”, 26 June 2015, available at: 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/latest/chinas-alibaba-launches-internet-bank/story-e6frg90f-1227415805816  
81 Tencent’s official website is here: http://www.tencent.com/en-us/index.shtml  
82 Reuters, “China’s Tencent hits $200 billion market cap for first time” (13 April 2015), available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/13/us-tencent-valuation-idUSKBN0N40WN20150413   
83 Vaseem Khan, “Alipay Vs Tenpay – The China Payments Rivalry”, LTP (12 February 2015), available at: 
http://letstalkpayments.com/alipay-vs-tenpay-the-china-payments-rivalry-2/  
84 See Wikipedia, “WeChat Red Envelope”, last modified on 29 March 2015, available at: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WeChat_red_envelope   
85 See Josh Horwitz, “Chinese WeChat users sent out 20 million cash-filled red envelopes to friends and family within two 
days”, TECHINASIA (5 February 2014), available at: 
https://www.techinasia.com/wechats-money-gifting-scheme-lures-5-million-chinese-users-alibabas-jack-ma-calls-pearl-
harbor-attack-company/  
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envelopes on New Year’s Eve and trumping Alipay in the “red envelope war”.86 The success 
of “Red Envelope” has made Tencent a formidable competitor in China’s digital payment 
market. As the giving of red envelope requires users to link their bank accounts to their 
WeChat accounts, the product creates “the basis for [Tencent’s] further financial 
applications”. 87 For example, in January 2014, Tencent, following in the footsteps of Alibaba, 
introduced a “Wealth” function into WeChat allowing users to store savings in the investment 
fund without minimum deposit requirements and to earn an annual interest rate of 6.435%.
88
 
More recently in January 2015, Tencent launched China’s first internet-based bank “WeBank” 
to serve small-scale borrowers wtih limited access to loans from state-owned banks.
89
  
Another example is Baidu, one of China’s most famous web services companies that operates 
China’s largest internet search engine.90 In October 2013, Baidu launched its own online 
wealth management product called “Baifa”.91 Similar to Alibaba’s Yu’E Bao and Tencent’s 
“Wealth”, Baifa provides a personal investment platform which allows customers to “make a 
minimum investment of RMB 1 (about $0.16) and … [earn] annual interest rates of up to 
eight percent” higher than the interest rates offered by Yu’E Bao and “Wealth”. 92 While less 
popular than Yu’e Bao and WeChat, Baifa “reportedly raised USD 165 million from 120,000 
customers on the day it launched”.93 In addition, Baidu has its own personal loan platform 
called Baidu Finance which allows customers to “borrow up to ten times their monthly 
income” with a flexible repayment term up to 3 years.94 Loan applications and approvals are 
all processed online within as quickly as 5 minutes.
95
 Most recently, Baidu launched another 
                                                          
86 See David Yin, “Tencent’s WeChat Sends 1 Billion Virtual Red Envelopes on New Year’s Eve”, Forbes (19 February 
2015), available at: 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidyin/2015/02/19/tencents-wechat-sends-1-billion-virtual-red-envelopes-on-new-years-
eve/; Gabriel Wlidau, “Tencent Beats Alibaba in ‘red envelope’ app war”, Financial Times (27 February 2015), available 
at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c39c96c6-be2a-11e4-8cf3-00144feab7de.html#axzz3eyf3RyLo 
87 See above n 36, Tang, Zhang & He, “The Rise of Digital Finance in China”, at 4.  
88 See Paul Bischoff, “WeChat leaps into banking, lets users set up online investment fund”, TECHINASIA (16 January 
2014), available at: https://www.techinasia.com/wechat-leaps-banking-lets-users-set-online-investment-fund/  
89 See Gabriel Wildau, “Tencent launches China’s first online-only bank”, Financial Times (5 January 2015), available at: 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ccc5a6dc-9488-11e4-82c7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3f4JCnBsS  
90 See Wikipedia, “Baidu”, last modified on 18 June 2015, available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baidu   
91 See Josh Horwitz, “Baidu announces upcoming launch of Baifa as it moves into personal finance”, TECHINASIA (21 
October 2013), available at: https://www.techinasia.com/baidu-announces-upcoming-launch-baifu-moves-personal-
finance/   
92 Ibid.  
93 Nisha Koul, “Chinese Internet Companies Alibaba, Baidu Offer Financial Services Through Subsidiaries Yu’e Bao, 
Baifa”, MicroCapital (5 February 2014), available at: http://www.microcapital.org/microcapital-brief-chinese-internet-
companies-alibaba-baidu-offer-financial-services-through-subsidiaries-yue-bao-baifa/   
94 Paul Bischoff, “Baidu rebrands online finance service, introduces loans”, TECHINASIA (25 April 2014), available at: 
https://www.techinasia.com/baidu-rebrands-online-finance-service-introduces-loans/ 
95 Ibid.   
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online investment fund called “Baifa Youxi” or “Baifa Me” which “lets users crowd-invest in 
upcoming movies and television shows” and offers an expected interest rate of 8 percent.96  
In addition to the internet or e-commerce giants above, a large number of other non-financial 
institutions have engaged in various types of digital finance businesses. For example, in its 
Financial Stability Report 2014 (PBOC Report 2014), the PBOC has reported that by 2013 
there were more than 250 internet payment institutions, “more than 350 active P2P online 
lending platforms”, and around 21 crowdfunding platforms in the market.97 These numbers 
increased dramatically in the past years. For example, while China was already the world’s 
largest P2P lending market by 2013, the number of P2P lending platforms in China has since 
continued to grow at a phenomenal pace.  By July 2015, there were 2,316 P2P lending 
platforms in China with settlements of around RMB 82.5 billion transactions in that single 
month.
98
 In respect of crowdfunding, the number of platforms increased to 116 by the end of 
2014 and they raised a total of RMB 915 million (about US$148m) in that year.
99
 Most 
recently, Dalian Wanda Group, one of China’s largest privately-owned enterprises, was 
reported as having raised RMB 5 billion (about US$805m) via its crowdfunding platforms.
 100
 
The rapid growth of these digital finance platforms shows the great potential of China’s DFS 
market and the fast-growing demand of investors and consumers for DFS in China.      
4. Regulation of Digital Financial Services in China 
While the phenomenal growth of traditional and non-traditional DFS in China in recent years 
has been fertilised by technological innovation and advancement and rapidly changing 
consumer behaviour and adaptation to forms of finance, China’s regulatory environment has 
provided the soil for the growth.    
                                                          
96 Paul Bischoff, “Baidu now lets anyone invest in movies, will make Chinese version of Gone with the Wind”, 
TECHINASIA (22 September 2014), available at: https://www.techinasia.com/baidu-lets-invest-movies-chinese-
version-emgone-windem/ 
97 See above n 48, “China Financial Stability Report 2014”, at 174-175. 
98 The data information is collected from www.wangdaizhijia.com a Chinese website providing all sorts of information on 
P2P lending in China. For the P2P data, see http://shuju.wangdaizhijia.com/industry-type-0-7-2015.html. For a recent 
report on the development of P2P lending in China, see Mingkang Liu, “Internet Finance and Regulation in China”, FGI 
Report (August 2015), available at: http://www.asiaglobalinstitute.hku.hk/en/internet-finance-regulation-china/   
99 Tracey Xiang, “China’s Crowdfunding Market as of 2014”, TechNode (23 January 2015), available at: 
http://technode.com/2015/01/23/chinas-crowdfunding-market-2014/  
100 Esther Fung, “China’s Wanda Group Raises $805 Million in Crowdfunding Push”, The Wall Street Journal (19 June 
2015), available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-wanda-group-raises-805-million-in-crowdfunding-push-
1434687631   
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As shown in section 2, the Chinese government has made great efforts to promote financial 
inclusion since 2005. The expansion of financial inclusion for SMEs and in rural areas was 
one of the policy priorities in China’s 11th Five-Year Plan.101 With the rapid advancement and 
wide adoption of technology, digital finance has been treated by the government as one of the 
most important means to improve financial inclusion. For example, China’s 12th Five-Year 
Plan for the Development and Reform of the Financial Industry gave strong policy direction 
for the promotion of technology and e-transactions in the financial sector.
102
 In line with the 
policy direction, China’s major banking regulators, PBOC and CBRC, have issued many 
statements and rules consistently aimed at encouraging the use of technology in the financial 
industry.
103
 For example, in the PBOC Report 2014, the PBOC endorsed five major 
contributions digital finance has made to the Chinese economy, including: (1) promoting 
inclusive finance, (2) propelling the development of private capital, (3) satisfying the demand 
of e-commerce development, (4) reducing transaction costs and improving allocation of 
resources, and (5) encouraging financial product innovation.
104
 The CBRC, as early as 2006, 
introduced Guidelines of Financial Innovation of Commercial Banks to “encourage financial 
innovation, supervise innovative activities, and speed up healthy and continuous development 
of new banking products and services”.105 More recently in 2012 and 2013, the CBRC re-
emphasized the significance of digital finance to the enhancement of financial inclusion and 
the development of China’s financial sector.106     
While encouraging the continuous development of digital finance, the Chinese government 
has been aware of the potential risks associated with DFS and the need for regulation. The 
PBOC Report 2014 identified some of the risks in relation to financial stability, consumer 
protection, competition in and efficiency of the financial sector, and illegal activities.
107
 In a 
policy briefing held by the State Council in January 2015, the need for balanced regulation 
and supervision of digital finance was emphasised.
108
 Two months later during the 3
rd
 Session 
                                                          
101 See Zhou Xiaochuan, “Achievements of Financial Sector Reform and Development in the 11th Five-Year Plan Period”, 
The People’s Bank of China (9 December 2010), available at: 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/955/2011/20110217095304062355521/20110217095304062355521_.html 
102 See The 12th Five-year Plan for the Development and Reform of the Financial Industry, at 38, available at: 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/201210/W020121010631355001488.pdf 
103 See generally above n 36, Tang, Zhang & He, “The Rise of Digital Finance in China”, at 11-12; above n 47, Shrader & 
Duflos, “China: A New paradigm in Branchless Banking”, at 21-27.   
104 See above n 48, “China Financial Stability Report 2014”, at 172-173. 
105 See CBRC, Guidelines on Financial Innovation of Commercial Banks, promulgated on 6 December 2006 and effective 
on 11 December 2006, official translation available at: http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/EngdocView.do?docID=2897  
106 See above n 47, Shrader & Duflos, “China: A New paradigm in Branchless Banking”, at 21, 23.   
107 See above n 48, “China Financial Stability Report 2014”, at 178-179. 
108 See The State Council of the PRC, “Full transcript of policy briefing of the State Council on Jan 23, 2015”, 23 January 
2015, available at: http://english.gov.cn/news/policy_briefings/2015/01/23/content_281475043823916.htm  
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of the 12
th
 National People's Congress (NPC), PBOC Deputy Governor Pan Gongsheng 
reportedly disclosed to the media that a regulatory framework on digital finance will be 
gradually established within the year and the goal of regulation is to “leave certain space for 
the development of Internet finance while drawing the bottom line clearly”.109 As the PBOC 
is now tasked to lead DFS regulatory activities under the 2015 Guideline discussed below, it 
is expected that the regulatory framework will be based on the five principles contemplated in 
the PBOC Report 2014, which were: 
(1) digital finance shall “aim to enhance the efficiency and capability of financial 
services” and must not be used for illegal activities such as cash pooling or “engage 
in securities business”; 
(2) digital finance must contribute to efficient allocation of resources and financial 
stability and must not cause abrupt price fluctuation or obvious increase in financial 
costs; 
(3) DFS providers must ensure that legitimate rights and interests of consumers are duly 
protected; 
(4) DFS providers must engage in fair competition and observe the relevant statutory 
requirements; and 
(5) to balance government supervision and industry self-discipline and give full play to 
self-discipline.
 110
  
With respect to the division of labour in the regulatory and supervisory framework, the role 
of the regulators has gradually taken shape. The PBOC leads regulatory activities generally 
and is “primarily responsible for overseeing payment-related services (such as third-party 
payment)”, anti-money laundering (AML) activities and the credit reporting industry. 111 The 
CBRC, with its local offices and supervisory agencies, is mainly responsible for the 
supervision of P2P lending platforms and crowdfunding and for consumer protection.
 112
 In 
addition, the Association of China Internet Financial Industry (ACIFI), China’s industry 
association on digital finance created in 2014, will be responsible for promoting self-
                                                          
109 See China Daily, “China to issue guidelines for Web finance companies”, 5 March 2015, available at: 
http://www.ecns.cn/business/2015/03-05/156739.shtml   
110 See above n 48, “China Financial Stability Report 2014”, at 178-179. 
111 See generally above n 36, Tang, Zhang & He, “The Rise of Digital Finance in China”, at 12; above n 47, Shrader & 
Duflos, “China: A New paradigm in Branchless Banking”, at 22. Also see China Daily, “Self-regulation of online 
financial industry”, 4 April 2014, available at: http://china.org.cn/business/2014-04/04/content_32001588.htm  
112 Ibid.  
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regulation of the industry
113
 in line with the 5
th
 principle set out in the PBOC Report 2014, 
rules developed by the financial regulators, and its own articles of association.
 
 
Prior to 2015, China’s regulatory framework on digital finance was very preliminary. Chinese 
financial authorities, businesses and scholars have shared the view that it was insufficient for 
a proper regulation of the rapidly growing digital finance sector.
114
 For the Chinese banking 
regulators, a comprehensive regulatory framework is much needed to “specify the bottom 
line, strengthen the oversight of the business and guide the industry, which is motivated by 
innovation, to develop in a healthy and sustainable way.”115  
The remainder of this section considers the major PRC legislation applicable to digital 
finance before 2015 and identifies their insufficiencies in the regulation of digital finance in 
China. 
4.1 CBRC Rules on Internet Banking  
In 2006, the CBRC issued Rules on the Administration of Electronic Banking (CBRC E-
banking Rule)
116
, and Guidelines on E-banking Security Evaluation
117
 (CBRC E-banking 
Guideline). In a press conference held by the CBRC, it emphasised the importance of risk 
management and security of e-banking businesses and clarified that the formulation of the 
two measures has been based on international standards (particularly Basel Risk Management 
                                                          
113 See above n 111, “Self-regulation of online financial industry”. The official website of ACIFI is here: http://www.a-
cifi.org/index.asp (in Chinese) 
114 See, for example, above n 109, “China to issue guidelines for Web finance companies”; J. An, B. Zhao & W. Wang, 
“The Internet Finance in China: The Living Space and the Regulations” (2015)8(S4) Indian Journal of Science and 
Technology 106-114; BangKun An & Jinyang Ruan, “Hu Lian Wang Jin Rong: Jian Guan Yu Fa Lv Zhun Ze” (“Internet 
Finance: Regulation and Legal Principles”) (2014)3 Jin Rong Jian Guan Yan Jiu (Financial Regulation Studies) 57-70. 
(in Chinese – article and journal titles translated by the author); Li Youxing, Chen Fei & Jin Youfang, “Hu Lian Wang 
Jin Rong Jian Guan De Tan Xi” (A Study on the Regulation of the Internet Finance) (2014)44(4) Journal of Zhejiang 
University 87-97 (in Chinese – article title translated by the author).  
115 See above n 48, “China Financial Stability Report 2014”, at 178. 
116 Dian Zi Yin Hang Ye Wu Guan Li Ban Fa (Rules on the Administration of Electronic Banking), promulgated by CBRC 
Decree No. 5 on 26 January 2006, effective on 1 March 2006. The Chinese official version of the Rule is here: 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/govView_EAB589F936AD446DA3F711CEEA97F2D9.html and a translated version is 
available at: http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=4913&CGid 
117 Dian Zi Yin Hang An Quan Ping Gu Zhi Yin (Guidelines on E-banking Security Evaluation), promulgated by CBRC 
Decree No. 9 on 26 January 2006, effective on 1 March 2006. The Chinese official version of the Rule is here: 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docDOC_ReadView/2245.html and a translated version is available at: 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=5816&CGid=  
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Principles for Electronic Banking 2003
118
) and the regulatory experience of developed 
countries (particularly the US and the EU).
119
 
The objective of the CBRC E-banking Rule is to strengthen the risk management of e-
banking businesses, to protect the legitimate rights and interests of consumers and banks, and 
to promote the healthy development of e-banking businesses (Article 1). The Rule applies to 
e-banking services provided by a financial institution via the internet, telephone, mobile 
phone and wireless networks, and other digital devices and networks (Article 2). Financial 
institutions are defined to include domestic banks, foreign-funded financial institutions 
established in accordance with the relevant PRC legislation, asset management companies, 
trust and investment companies, finance companies, financial leasing companies and other 
financial institutions approved by the CBRC to be established within China (Article 3). The 
Rule is too detailed to set out in full; but the key provisions can be summarised as follows:  
(1) Two general principles: Financial institutions proposing to conduct domestic or 
cross-border e-banking businesses must (1) seek approval of the CBRC (Article 4), 
and (2) establish a comprehensive internal risk management and control system and a 
department with competent personnel to operate and manage the system (Article 6);  
(2) Domestic e-banking businesses: to conduct e-banking businesses domestically, 
financial institutions must satisfy six basic criteria and five additional criteria 
applicable to the provision of internet banking and mobile phone banking services 
(Articles 9 & 10). These criteria essentially require financial institutions to have 
viable e-banking business plans and strategy, and the professional capability, 
infrastructure, competent personnel and reliable internal system to control and 
manage risks associated with the operation of e-banking businesses. The detail 
requirements of application procedures and documents are set out in Articles 15-19 
and approval procedures for subsequent alterations in e-banking businesses are set out 
in Articles 21-26. Financial institutions wanting to close all or part of their e-banking 
businesses must nofity the CBRC 3 months in advance with the notification made 
                                                          
118 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Risk Management Principles for Electronic Banking, July 2003, available at: 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs98.pdf   
119 CBRC, Yin Jian Hui Fa Yan Ren Jiu Dian Zi Yin Hang Ye Wu Guan Li Ban Fa He Dian Zi Yin Hang An Quan Ping Gu 
Zhi Yin Da Ji Zhe Wen (CBRC Spokesperson Answers Questions of Reporters on Rules on the Administration of 
Electronic Banking and Guidelines on E-banking Security Evaluation), undated, available at: 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docView/2243.html (in Chinese - title translated by the author) 
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public at the same time (Article 28). Amongst other responsibilities, reporting 
institutions must take steps to protect the legitimate interests of their customers;  
(3) Cross-border e-banking businesses: for cross-border e-banking businesses (that is, 
the provision of e-banking businesses to customers overseas using the e-banking 
platform of the financial institutions in China), financial institutions are required to 
satisfy criteria in addition to those applicable to the provision of domestic e-banking 
services (Articles 71-74). These criteria mainly concern compliance with laws of the 
country where the target customers reside, and the reporting to the CBRC of matters 
such as the scope of the services and the contractual arrangement between the 
financial institutions and the customers; 
(4) Internal risk management and external professional evaluation: Financial 
institutions are required to prepare a self-evaluation report on an annual basis to report 
to the CBRC the development, operation and profitability, and risk management of 
their e-banking businesses (Articles 77-79). In addition, financial institutions are also 
required to engage a qualified valuation firm recognised by the CBRC to conduct a 
security evaluation of their e-banking system (Articles 85-86). The qualification 
requirements of valuation agencies are set out in the CBRC E-banking Guideline. 
According to the Guideline, a valuation agent can be an internal department of a 
financial institution or external professional firms (Article 7). The qualification 
requirements mainly concern whether a valuation agent has the capacity, expertise, 
experience and competent personnel to conduct security evaluations (Articles 8). In 
addition to these requirements, an internal valuation department of a financial 
institution must be independent from the other departments of the institution and must 
have not been involved in the procurement of e-banking devices for the institution 
(Article 9). The Guideline also sets out detailed rules on the application and approval 
of valuation agents, the elements of valuation, and the management of valuation; and 
(5) Liabilities: Financial institutions are responsible for any damages suffered by 
consumers which are caused by factors not attributable to the consumers such as 
security problems or illegal operations of e-banking systems by the financial 
institutions (Article 89).        
Thus, the CBRC E-banking Rule and the CBRC E-banking Guideline seem to have 
established a comprehensive mechanism to regulate and oversee the provision of e-banking 
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businesses by financial institutions. The comprehensiveness of the measures is reflected in at 
least the following aspects. First, they not only cover all typical electronic banking businesses 
(i.e. internet, telephone and mobile phone banking) but also have the potential to be applied 
to other forms of electronic banking that may be developed in the future. Second, in addition 
to conventional financial institutions, the two measures should also apply to newly 
established financial institutions such as the two internet-based private banks created in 2014 
– Alibaba’s MYbank and Tencent’s WeBank. Third, the risk management system created 
under the measures tackles some of the most significant risks perceived by consumers using 
digital banking, that is, security and technical failures.
120
 Fourth, the combination of external 
approval and evaluation with internal self-discipline and management has created a 
systematic mechanism necessary for the protection of customer rights and interests, the 
maintenance of financial accountability and the sustainable development of e-banking 
businesses in China.  
However, weaknesses of the two measures can also be identified.
121
 For example, they do not 
provide detailed rules on the protection of clients’ information and privacy. In this regard, 
section 52 of the CBRC E-banking Rule merely requires financial institutions to take proper 
steps to ensure that e-banking services are operated in a way that complies with relevant laws 
and regulations. Given the high risk of loss of information and privacy on the internet, it 
would be necessary for the Rule to provide in detail the steps that financial institutions must 
take to protect clients’ information and privacy and the consequences if they fail to do so. 
Further, the Rule does not set out in detail the disclosure obligations of financial institutions 
and hence do not provide sufficient protection for consumers. In addition, the Rule does not 
contain any provision that deals with money laundering activities. This lack of provisions is 
intensified given the insufficient supervision of the provision of cross-border e-banking 
services. In this connection, the Rule merely sets out the documents that need to be lodged to 
the CBRC by cross-border e-banking services applicants and is silent on the criteria to be 
applied by the CBRC in deciding whether to approve an application.  
                                                          
120 See above n 50, Yuan, “Present and Future of Internet Banking in China”, at 5.  
121 See, for example, Lanyu Wang, “Wo Guo Wang Shang Yin Hang Jian Guan De Bu Zu Ji Wan Shan Lu Jing” (The 
Weaknesses of China’s Regulation of Internet Banking and Some Recommendations), Cai Kuai Yue Kan (Finance & 
Accounting Monthly), November 2011, 92-93, available at: http://pdf2012.ckyk.cn/upload_files/20120331/7868769.pdf 
(in Chinese - article and journal titles translated by the author); Yong Pan & Yan Xing, “Lun Wo Guo Wang Shang Yin 
Hang De Jian Guan Ji Qi Wan Shan” (An Analysis of China’s Regulation of Internet Banking and Some 
Recommendations), China Civil and Commercial Law (28 December 2010), available at: 
http://old.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=51686 (in Chinese – article title translated by the author) 
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4.2 PBOC Rules on Third Party Payment Services                 
In 2010, the PBOC issued Rules on the Administration of Payment Services Provided by Non-
Financial Institutions
122
 (PBOC Payment Rule) and Measures on the Implementation of the 
Rules on the Administration of Payment Services Provided by Non-Financial Institutions
123
 
(PBOC Payment Implementation Measure). While the Rule provides the basic framework for 
the regulation of third-party payment services provided by non-financial institutions, the 
Measure complements the Rule by providing detailed definitions, application procedures, 
documentary requirements and other supplementary rules. They are applicable to the third-
party payment businesses operated by the internet or e-commence companies discussed 
above such as Alibaba’s Taobao and Alipay, Tencent’s Tenpay, and all of the payment 
institutions approved by the PBOC. 
The PBOC Payment Rule is aimed to regulate the provision of payment services by non-
financial institutions and to protect the legitimate interests of consumers and other 
stakeholders (Article 1). “Payment Services” refer to monetary transfer services provided by 
non-financial institutions as an intermediary between payers and payees (i.e. third-party 
payment services) including internet payment, issuance and acceptance of prepaid cards, 
acceptance of bank cards, and other payment services prescribed by the PBOC (Article 2).  
The Rule sets forth a general prohibition of non-financial institutions or individuals from 
providing the defined third-party payment services unless they hold a Payment Services 
Licence (PSL) issued by the PBOC and become a payment institution (Article 3). The main 
licensing requirements include (1) minimum capital requirements (i.e. RMB 100 million for 
the provision of payment services nationally or RMB 30 million for the provision of payment 
services at provincial levels); (2) investor requirements, such as that the main shareholders of 
a non-financial institution applicant (being one holding 10% or more interests in the applicant 
or actually controlling the applicant) must have provided payment services for more than two 
years and made profits for more than two consecutive years; and (3) personnel, organisational 
and facility requirements (Articles 8-10). A PSL has a term of five years; and renewal 
                                                          
122 Fei Jin Rong Ji Gou Zhi Fu Fu Wu Guan Li Ban Fa (Rules on the Administration of Payment Services Provided by Non-
Financial Institutions), promulgated by PBOC Decree No. 2 on 14 June 2010, effective on 1 September 2010. The 
Chinese official version of the Rule is here: http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2010-06/21/content_1632796.htm and a translated 
version is available at: http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=134238   
123 Fei Jin Rong Ji Gou Zhi Fu Fu Wu Guan Li Ban Fa Shi Shi Xi Ze (Measures on the Implementation of the Rules on the 
Administration of Payment Services Provided by Non-Financial Institutions), promulgated by PBOC Decree No. 17 on 1 
December 2010, effective on the same date. The Chinese official version of the Rule is here: 
http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2010-12/03/content_1759169.htm and a translated version is available at: 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=8564&CGid 
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applications must be lodged with the local branches of PBOC six months prior to its expiry 
date (Article 13). Any changes in relation to the name, registered capital, organisational 
structure, main shareholder of a PSL holder, or merger or demerger of a PSL holder, or 
alterations of the type or scope of its business must be approved by the PBOC (Article 14).  
Further, the Rule sets forth a number of major restrictions or requirements: 
(1) a PSL holder must not outsource its payment services; nor is it allowed to transfer, 
lease or lend its license (Article 17);  
(2) a PSL holder must formulate and publically disclose its standard payment services 
agreement and lodge a copy of the agreement with the local branch of the PBOC 
(Article 21); and  
(3) restrictions are imposed on how a PSL holder shall deal with funds received from 
clients for payment services, including that the PSL holder must not treat the funds as 
its own property; must deposit the funds into a special deposit account opened with 
and subject to the supervision of a commercial bank; and can only transfer the funds 
when and as directed by clients (Articles 24, 26 & 29) Further, each PSL holder can 
only open one special deposit account at one branch of the commercial bank (Article 
26). In addition, the monetary capital paid by a PSL holder must not be lower than 10 
percent of its 90 days average balance of clients’ funds (Article 30). 
Finally, the Rule applies retrospectively to all non-financial institutions which had already 
engaged in payment services businesses and requires these institutions to obtain a PSL within 
1 year of the effective date of the Rule (Article 48). 
Thus, the PBOC Payment Rule imposes strict entry thresholds and onerous obligations on 
third party payment providers. These are necessary to maintain quality services and high 
levels of consumer protection and to control the potential risks associated with third party 
payment services (especially those by digital means) and illegal activities. It was predicted 
that at least half of the non-financial institutions providing third party payment services prior 
to the promulgation of the Rule may have to exit the market.
124
 However, the PBOC has 
clarified that the Rule is not intended to impose any quantitative restrictions and will allow 
                                                          
124 Yingzhi Fang, Fei Jin Rong Ji Gou Zhi Fu Fu Wu Guan Li Ban Fa Jie Du Bao Gao (An evaluation report on Rules on 
the Administration of Payment Services Provided by Non-Financial Institutions), China E-Commerce Research Centre 
(CECRC) (26 June 2010), available at: http://b2b.toocle.com/detail--5232440.html (in Chinese - title translated by the 
author)  
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the issuance of a PSL to all qualified applicants.
125
 According to the PBOC, there have been 
around 270 licensed payment institutions by May 2015.
126
 The Rule, therefore, accords with 
the Chinese government’s commitments to a balanced approach to the regulation of internet 
finance. 
After five years of implementation, the weaknesses of the PBOC Payment Rule have surfaced. 
During the 3
rd
 Session of the 12
th
 NPC of the PRC, one of the representatives pointed out that 
the low legislative level of the Rule (being merely a departmental rule) has caused difficulties 
in encouraging coordination between the PBOC and other regulatory authorities in enforcing 
the Rule.
127
 To remedy this weakness, it is recommended that the State Council formulate and 
issue regulations on third party payments. Further, the Rule is not sufficiently detailed on 
issues such as AML and the protection of clients’ funds received for payment services. For 
example, although the Rule attempts to prohibit the misappropriation of clients’ funds by 
payment institutions, it is silent on issues such as the payment of interests on funds and 
whether the funds may be used for investment. Moreover, the monetary penalty imposed on 
payment institutions for their breach of duties (i.e. up to RMB 30,000) is too low to be an 
effective deterrence. Finally, the Rule does not contain specific provisions on the regulation 
and supervision of cross-border third party payment businesses. The improvement of the Rule 
must also involve the introduction of an exit mechanism for existing payment institutions 
which fail to obtain or renew their licenses so as to protect the rights and interests of 
consumers.  
4.3 Legislation on P2P Lending and Crowdfunding 
Over the past five years, the Chinese government has become increasingly aware of the risks 
and illegal activities (such as cash pooling) that may arise in the context of P2P lending and 
crowdfunding, and has been considering developing specific rules to regulate these activities.  
For example, since 2011, increasing numbers of P2P lending companies have abruptly 
collapsed due to financial difficulties, and strong voices have been calling for the 
                                                          
125  Ren Min Yin Hang Jiu Fei Jin Rong Ji Gou Zhi Fu Fu Wu Guan Li Ban Fa Da Wen (PBOC Answers Questions of 
Reporters on Rules on the Administration of Payment Services Provided by Non-Financial Institutions), 28 June 2010, 
available at: http://cfg.fabao.cn/falvfagui/sfwj/n214184927.shtml (in Chinese - title translated by the author)  
126   PBOC, Yi Huo Xu Ke Ji Gou (Zhi Fu Ji Gou) (Licensed Payment Institutions), available at: 
 http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/zhengwugongkai/3580/index.html (in Chinese - webpage title translated by the author)  
127  Yuzhe Zhang, Zhou Dong Xue Dai Biao: Ying Jin Kuai Chu Tai Fei Jin Rong Ji Gou Zhi Fu Fu Wu Guan Li Tiao Li 
(Representative Zhou Dongxue: Regulations on Payment Services Provided by Non-Financial Institutions should be 
promulgated), CAIXIN (4 March 2015), available at: http://topics.caixin.com/2015-03-04/100787732.html (in Chinese - 
title translated by the author) 
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promulgation of regulations on P2P lending.
128
 In response, the CBRC issued Circular on 
Risks Associated with Peer-to-Peer Lending (CBRC P2P Circular) on 23 August 2011.
129
 
However, instead of providing specific rules on P2P lending, the Circular merely identifies a 
number of risks associated with P2P lending as a result of lack of regulation and supervision, 
such as illegal funding, fraudulent activities, money laundering, credit and reputational risks, 
etc. The CBRC P2P Circular has been proven ineffective to control these risks by the high 
and increasing default rates in P2P lending between 2011 and 2014.
130
 These risks may also 
arise from crowdfunding activities.
131
   
Apart from the CBRC P2P Circular, specific regulations or rules on P2P lending and 
crowdfunding have yet to be promulgated. It has been widely reported that the CBRC has 
developed draft rules on P2P lending and crowdfunding and is currently consulting with other 
authorities, relevant industries, experts and other stakeholders.
132
 The latest development is 
the publication of a consultation draft of Measures on the Administration of Equity 
Crowdfunding in December 2014 by the CSRC and the Securities Association of China 
(SAC).
133
 This instrument makes lawful equity crowdfunding activities and sets out the entry 
criteria, obligations and liabilities, registration and reporting requirements in relation to 
equity crowdfunding platforms and investors. However, it appears that the measure is 
intended to be an industry self-discipline instrument to be administered by the SAC rather 
than be a CSRC rule. Further, it only covers equity crowdfunding and does not apply to other 
                                                          
128  Takeshi Jungu, “Risks and Opportunities in China’s Growing P2P Lending Market”, Nomura Research Institute (10 
September 2014), at 2, available at: https://www.nri.com/~/media/PDF/global/opinion/lakyara/2014/lkr2014202.pdf; 
Jinyan Zhang, “Lun Wo Guo Ren Ren Dai De Fa Zhan Xian Zhuang, Zhu Yao Feng Xian Ji Fa Lv Gui Fan” (An 
Analysis of the Current State, Major Risks and Regulations of P2P Lending in China) (2013)(3) Xi Nan Jin Rong 
(Southwest Finance), available at: 
http://202.119.108.161:93/modules/showContent.aspx?title=&Word=&DocGUID=fa477088bf1a45139fa721de20468e8
d  (in Chinese – article and journal title translated by the author)  
129  Guan Yu Ren Ren Dai You Guan Feng Xian Ti Shi De Tong Zhi (Circular on Risks Associated with Peer-to-Peer 
Lending), promulgated by the General Office of the CBRC Circular No. 254 on 23 August 2011, effective on the same 
date. The Chinese official version of the Rule is here: http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=159009  
and a translated version is available at: http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=159009&lib=law  
130 See above n 98, Liu, “Internet Finance and Regulation in China”, at 15. 
131  Jerin Mathew, “China Warns of Illegal P2P Lending and Crowd Funding Loopholes”, International Business Times (22 
April 2015), available at: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/china-warns-illegal-p2p-lending-crowd-funding-loopholes-1445535  
132  See, for example, JD Alois, “China Banking Regulatory Commission is Circulating Peer to Peer Lending Rules”, 
Crowdfund Insider (19 March 2015), available at: http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/03/64658-china-banking-
regulatory-commission-is-circulating-peer-to-peer-lending-rules/; JD Alois, “China: Draft Regulations Published for 
Equity Crowdfunding as ShareIn Partners with BOP to Expand”, Crowdfund Insider (2 February 2015), available at: 
http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/02/62055-china-draft-regulations-published-for-equity-crowdfunding-as-
sharein-partners-with-bop-to-expand/ 
133  A Chinese version of the consultation draft can be found here: 
http://www.sac.net.cn/tzgg/201412/P020141218543931814762.doc. No translated version has been made available. 
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forms of crowdfunding activities which have represented the majority of crowdfunding 
platforms in China.
134
        
Given the absence of specific regulations on P2P lending and crowdfunding, existing PRC 
legislation will apply to these activities. For example, the Contract Law of the PRC
135
 may be 
considered as providing the legal basis for P2P lending and crowdfunding activities as they 
are essentially based on different kinds of contractual arrangements. With respect to lending, 
Chapter 12 of the Contract Law sets out the general rules on loan contracts. Further, the 
PBOC’s General Rules on Loans136 provides more detailed rules on lending activities in 
general including types of loans, repayment terms, interest rates, rights and obligations of 
lenders and borrowers, liabilities, etc. However, the Rules were drafted some 20 years ago 
and do not respond adequately to the novel and complex issues associated with online lending. 
Moreover, the Criminal Law of the PRC
137
 condemns activities that constitute illegal taking 
of deposits from the public (Article 176) and fund-raising by fraudulent means (Article 192); 
and these provisions also apply to P2P lending and crowdfunding activities. Despite these 
general laws, therefore, specific rules on P2P lending and crowdfunding are urgently needed 
to protect the rights and interests of consumers and safeguard the healthy development of 
these activities so as to contribute to the stability and growth of China’s financial system.  
A comprehensive framework is thus lacking, though expected in the near future, as discussed 
further in the following section.  
4.4 Legislation on Internet Investment Fund 
As with P2P lending and crowdfunding, a regulatory vacuum also exists in relation to the 
online investment or management funds such as Alibaba’s Yu’e Bao, Baidu’s Baifa and 
Tencent’s Wealth. PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan has been cited by the media as having 
highlighted the intention of the government to develop regulations in the sector rather than to 
                                                          
134  See Tracey Xiang, “China’s Crowdfunding Market as of 2014”, TechNode (23 January 2015), available at: 
http://technode.com/2015/01/23/chinas-crowdfunding-market-2014/  
135  Contract Law of the PRC, adopted at the 2nd meeting of the 9th NPC on 15 March 1999, effective on 1 October 1999.  
136  General Rules on Loans, promulgated by PBOC Decree No. 2 on 28 June 1996 and effective on 1 August 1996. 
137  Criminal Law of the PRC, adopted at the 2nd meeting of the 5th NPC on 1 July 1979; amended on 14 March 1997, 25 
December 1999, 31 August 2001, 28 December 2002, 28 February 2005, 29 June 2006, 28 February 2009, and 25 
February 2011.  
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crack down on these platforms.
138
 In the absence of specific rules, the existing legislation 
mentioned above provides some basic rules applicable to these activities. 
4.5 Consumer Protection 
As shown above, consumer protection is one of the key objectives of the existing regulations 
in the digital finance sector. As to specific protections, the PBOC Payment Rule, for example, 
requires a PSL holder to keep confidential the trade secrets of clients and properly preserve 
client’ information (Articles 33 & 34). The CBRC E-banking Rule, for example, requires e-
banking services providers to enter into a service agreement with clients and to disclose to 
clients matters such as risks, rights and obligations (Article 39). In addition to the specific 
rules above, consumers’ rights and interests are generally protected under general laws such 
as Law of the PRC on Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests
139
 and Anti-Unfair 
Competition Law of the PRC
140
. 
Despite the above, it was widely accepted in the 2015 Forum on the Protection of Consumers 
in Digital Finance Sector (Forum) held in Beijing that the existing protections afforded to 
consumers are inadequate and need to be strengthened.
141
 The Forum discussed various 
aspects of consumer protection in the face of the digital finance boom in China such as the 
obligations of disclosure by DFS providers, the rights of consumers to be informed of the 
risks associated with digital finance products, the enhancement of transparency, the 
protection of privacy and clients information, the improvement of internet security, the 
prohibition of fraudulent activities, and the rights of consumers to claim compensation and 
damages. ACIFI, China’s DFS industry association, has also marked consumer protection as 
one of the four fundamental principles that should guide the development of the sector in the 
coming years.
142
 These efforts suggest that there remains much to be done by regulators to 
establish a comprehensive mechanism for consumer protection. A typical issue concerns the 
right of consumers to claim compensation or damages in cases where P2P lending or 
                                                          
138  See, for example, Paul Mozur, “Baidu CEO Calls for More Regulation of Online Funds”, The Wall Street Journal (3 
March 2014), available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304585004579418141247893328. 
139  Law of the PRC on Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests, adopted at the 4th Meeting of the Standing Committee 
of the 8th NPC on 31 October 1993; amended on 27 August 2009, and 25 October 2013 and effective as of 15 March 
2014. 
140  Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the PRC, adopted at the 3rd session of the Standing Committee of the 8th NPC, 
promulgated on 2 September 1993, effective on 1 December 1993. 
141  2015 Hu Lian Wang Jin Rong Xiao Fei Zhe Quan Yi Bao Hu Lun Tan (2015 Forum on the Protection of Consumers in 
Digital Finance Sector), held on 14 March 2015 in Renmin University, Beijing, information page available at: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/live/20150314a/index.htm (in Chinese - title translated by the author) 
142  ACIFI, “2015-2018 Nian Hu Lian Wang Jin Rong Fa Zhan Zhi Dao Gang Yao” (Guidelines on the Development of 
China’s Digital Finance Sector 2015-2018), published on 5 June 2015, available at:  
http://www.a-cifi.org/hyzlview.asp?id=998 (in Chinese – title translated by the author) 
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crowdfunding companies abruptly close and vanish. Given the significance of this issue in 
recent years, specific rules need to be developed to afford full protection to consumers.         
4.6 Anti-Money Laundering 
Significant international efforts have been made to develop guidelines and common standards 
for AML as money laundering has become a global issue in the financial sector.
143
 
China has been very active in establishing an AML regime.
144
 In 2006, China published its 
first general AML statute, the Law of the PRC on Anti-Money Laundering
145
 (AML Law). In 
order to tackle money laundering within financial institutions, the PBOC subsequently 
formulated a list of instruments including Rules for Anti-Money Laundering by Financial 
Institutions
146
 2006 (PBOC AML Rule), Measures on the Administration of Reporting of 
Large-Value and Suspicious Transactions by Financial Institutions
147
 2006 (PBOC Reporting 
Measure), Circular on Further Strengthening the Anti-Money Laundering Work of Financial 
Institutions
148
 2008 (PBOC AML Circular), and Measures on the Administration of Anti-
Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing of Payment Institutions
149
 2012 (PBOC 
AML and ATF Measure on Payment Institutions). In addition, AML provisions have also 
been incorporated into some of the existing regulations on digital finance. For example, in 
                                                          
143 Louise Malady, Ross Buckley & Douglas Arner, “Developing and Implementing AML/CFT Measures using a Risk-
Based Approach for New Payments Products and Services”, research funded by CIFR, UNCDF, Standard Chartered 
Bank and UNSW, June 2014, available at:http://www.uncdf.org/sites/default/files/Documents/using_a_risk-
based_approach_for_aml_cft_measures_for_new_payment_technologies_june_2014.pdf; Lixin Yan, Lishan Ai & Jun 
Tang, “Risk-based AML regulation on internet payment services in China” (2011)14(1) Journal of Money Laundering 
Control  93-101. 
144 For a comprehensive study on China’s AML regime in the financial industry and analysis of the weaknesses of the 
regime, see Lishan Ai, Anti-money Laundering (AML) Regulation and Implementation in Chinese Financial Sectors: 
Money-Laundering Vulnerabilities and the ‘Rule-Based but Risk-Oriented’ AML Approach, PhD Thesis submitted to the 
University of Wollongong 2012, available at: http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4643&context=theses; 
Nicole Schulte-Kulkmann, “How China Fights Money Laundering: Recent Developments in Regulation and 
Supervision”, Research Group on the Political Economy of China, Trier University, China Analysis No. 56 (February 
2007), available at: http://www.chinapolitik.de/studien/china_analysis/no_56.pdf.   
145 Law of the PRC on Anti-Money Laundering, adopted at the 24th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 10th NPC on 
31 October 2006, effective on 1 July 2007. Official translation available at: 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/11/content_21900160.htm  
146 Rules for Anti-Money Laundering by Financial Institutions, promulgated by the PBOC Decree No. 1 on 6 November 
2006, effective on 1 January 2007. Official translation available at: 
 http://english.gov.cn/services/investment/2014/08/23/content_281474982978019.htm  
147 Measures on the Administration of Reporting of Large-Value and Suspicious Transactions by Financial Institutions, 
promulgated by the PBOC Decree No. 2 on 14 November 2006, effective on 1 March 2007. Official Chinese version is 
here: http://www.msfunds.com.cn/upload/201505/08/201505080930439888.pdf; a translated version is available at: 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=5645&CGid= 
148 Circular on Further Strengthening the Anti-Money Laundering Work of Financial Institutions, promulgated by the 
PBOC Circular No. 391 on 30 December 2008. Official Chinese version is here: 
https://www.lionfund.com.cn/data/20090610154950fanxq.pdf; a translated version is available at: 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=7303&CGid=  
149 Rules on the Administration of Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing of Payment Institutions, 
promulgated by the PBOC Decree No. 54 on 5 March 2012. Official Chinese version is here: 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/fanxiqianju/696/2012/20120412161459545740867/20120412161459545740867_.html  
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applying for a PSL under the PBOC Payment Rule, one of the requirements is that the 
applicant must have adopted proper AML measures and must observe the relevant AML laws 
(Articles 6 & 8).  
The Research Group on Equity Market Regulation, which has undertaken a research project 
into China’s AML regime, provided a good high-level summary of China’s AML laws as 
follows: 
Anti-money laundering regulation in the PRC in essence follows a 'command and 
control' model by imposing legal standards on certain - financial and non-
financial - institutions vulnerable to money laundering activities and by designing 
governmental institutions responsible for supervising the implementation of these 
standards as well as for imposing sanctions in case of violations of anti-money 
laundering regulations and standards.
150
 
The AML Law is based on three overarching objectives including, protection of financial 
integrity, anti-corruption and harmonisation with international standards.
151
 The Law applies 
to all financial institutions established in China and “the special non-financial institutions that 
are required by relevant regulations to perform the obligation of” AML (Article 3). It sets out 
in detail the responsibilities of relevant authorities in supervising AML activities (Chapter II), 
the obligations of financial institutions in combating money laundering (Chapter III), 
substantive and procedural rules on AML investigations (Chapter IV), and liabilities of the 
relevant authorities, financial institutions and their responsible officers and employees 
(Chapter VI).  Further, the Law establishes a mandate for China to participate in international 
AML efforts including to work with other countries in AML activities (Chapter V). In 
addition, given the close connection between money laundering and terrorist activities, 
Article 36 of the AML Law extends the applicability of the law to the monitoring of the 
financing of terrorist activities. According to some observers, the AML Law has substantially 
improved China’s AML regime by making it more comprehensive, clear and consistent with 
international standards.
152
         
                                                          
150 The project is run by Professor Sebastian Heilmann and Nicole Schulte-Kulkmann – the quote is extracted from the 
project description here: http://www.chinapolitik.de/regem/aml/index.html.   
151 See above n 144, Kulkmann, “How China Fights Money Laundering: Recent Developments in Regulation and 
Supervision”, at 7-8; Ai, Anti-money Laundering (AML) Regulation and Implementation in Chinese Financial Sectors, at 
67-70. 
152 See above n 144, Kulkmann, “How China Fights Money Laundering: Recent Developments in Regulation and 
Supervision”, at 11-12; Ai, Anti-money Laundering (AML) Regulation and Implementation in Chinese Financial Sectors, 
at 68. 
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The introduction of the PBOC AML Circular in 2008 marked a shift in China’s AML regime 
from a command-and-control-based approach to a more risk-based approach (RBA).
153
 The 
Circular mandates the strengthening of internal AML-control and risk management 
mechanisms of financial institutions, the conducting of customer due diligence (CDD) based 
on identified risk levels of customers, and the establishment of a risk-based record-keeping 
and reporting system. This is a further step towards an internationally recognised approach to 
AML.
154
     
Despite the progressive development of China’s AML regime, the current regime retains 
significant weaknesses. For example, the current AML regime focuses on financial 
institutions and does not fully cover non-financial entities. The AML Law states that it 
applies to “the special non-financial institutions that are required by relevant regulations to 
perform the obligation of” AML. However, the term “special non-financial institutions” is not 
defined in either the AML Law, the PBOC AML Rule or the PBOC Reporting Measure, 
making it unclear as to what non-financial entities are embraced by the current regime. This 
lack of definition or clear inclusion, as some have pointed out, was due to the resistance of 
non-financial businesses and professions in China to the potential responsibilities they would 
have to assume under the AML regime.
155
 Accordingly, the regulation of money laundering 
activities by non-financial entities has been largely left for further regulatory efforts. One 
such example is the PBOC AML and ATF Rule on Payment Institutions which has clearly 
included non-financial payment institutions established in accordance with the PBOC 
Payment Rule into the AML regime. However, as non-financial institutions are growing in 
number and scale in all sorts of digital finance businesses in China, other specific regulations 
are urgently needed to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing activities by these 
institutions. Moreover, the current AML awareness system, which aims to inform customers 
of the risks and harms of money laundering and promote their cooperation in AML, has 
remained underdeveloped given the lack of detailed rules and guidance on the content and 
conducting of awareness activities.
156
 To remedy this weakness, the Chinese government 
needs to develop a more comprehensive and workable CDD system including, for example, 
detailed requirements of ‘Know Your Customer’ (KYC) in line with international 
                                                          
153 See above n 143, Yan, Ai & Tang, “Risk-based AML regulation on internet payment services in China”, at 97.  
154 See above n 143.  
155 See above n 144, Kulkmann,“How China Fights Money Laundering: Recent Developments in Regulation and 
Supervision”, at 12-13. 
156 See above n 144, Ai, Anti-money Laundering (AML) Regulation and Implementation in Chinese Financial Sectors, at 
92-93. 
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standards.
157
 Furthermore, China’s AML regime lacks the capacity to deal with, and hence is 
vulnerable to, AML activities based on new technology and new forms of financial 
services.
158
 Given these developments in the financial industry, new rules on CDD, record-
keeping and reporting also need to be developed. Finally, a comprehensive RBA to AML has 
yet to be established. This would require detailed and workable rules on, for example, risk 
ratings of customers, types of financial services, and jurisdictions; internal risk management; 
record-keeping and reporting; and gathering, sorting and assessing risk-related 
information.
159
 In fact, a RBA to AML has been regarded as an effective means to tackle 
money laundering by financial and non-financial institutions in the digital finance era.
160
 In 
addition, two major shortcomings can be identified with respect to implementation and 
enforcement of China’s AML regime. One concerns the fact that most of the commercial 
banks in China remain state-owned and hence state-protected, which increases the difficulties 
of detecting and sanctioning money laundering activities.
161
 The other concerns the lack of a 
clear division of labour between China’s financial regulators, which increases the difficulties 
of institutional coordination and adversely affects the implementation and enforcement of the 
AML regime.
162
   
In short, the problems of China’s current AML regime have to do with almost every aspect of 
the regime from existing laws and regulations to implementation and enforcement. Future 
regulatory efforts of the Chinese government, especially the financial authorities, should 
develop comprehensive, detailed and workable rules based on international standards but 
tailored to the regulatory environment in China. The rules must have the capacity to deal with 
AML activities by financial and non-financial entities through new forms and means of 
finance, while at the same time leaving sufficient space for the sustainable development of 
digital finance in China.   
                                                          
157 Ibid., at 140-143. 
158 Ibid., at 192-200. 
159 Ibid., at 228-262. 
160 See above n 143, Yan, Ai & Tang, “Risk-based AML regulation on internet payment services in China”; above n 144, Ai, 
Anti-money Laundering (AML) Regulation and Implementation in Chinese Financial Sectors, at 264-301.  
161 See above n 144, Ai, Anti-money Laundering (AML) Regulation and Implementation in Chinese Financial Sectors, at 
135. 
162 See, for example, above n 144, Kulkmann, “How China Fights Money Laundering: Recent Developments in Regulation 
and Supervision”. 
Page 35 of 39 
 
5. The 2015 DFS Guideline 
The year 2015 has seen increasing efforts of the Chinese government to promote the 
development of a comprehensive regulatory framework for DFS. The promulgation of the 
2015 DFS Guideline is a significant achievement in the regulatory process, and provides a 
roadmap for the regulatory work of responsible authorities. 
The Guideline reiterates the significance of digital finance to the expansion of financial 
inclusion and confirms the overarching principle and policy orientation as being to support 
and promote the development and growth of DFS in China. Specific approaches laid down in 
the Guideline include to: 
(1) actively promote the innovation of platforms and types of DFS by financial 
institutions, internet companies and e-commerce companies in accordance with 
relevant laws and regulations. A list of encouraged DFS is set out in the Guideline 
including internet payment, online lending, equity crowdfunding and other digital 
financial products; 
(2) encourage cooperation between digital finance providers, including between banks 
and internet firms, and between internet firms and other institutions providing 
financial services to SMEs and individuals. An attempt has been made to encourage 
banks to provide deposit, fund management and settlement services to third party 
payment services providers and online lending platforms. This is significant as banks 
have previously been reluctant to do so and have imposed very high technical 
requirements and costs in practice; 
(3) create a more favourable environment for the financing of DFS providers by 
encouraging other entities and individuals to create DFS funds, qualified digital 
finance providers to apply for listing on domestic stock exchanges, and banks to 
support DFS start-ups; 
(4) streamline and decentralise the administration of DFS by mandating the relevant 
regulatory authorities to provide full support for digital finance providers in a range 
of regulatory areas, from the administration of company registration by industry and 
commerce departments and the administration of telecommunication services by 
telecommunication regulators, to internet censorship and the protection of intellectual 
property rights of digital finance providers; 
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(5) provide tax benefits for DFS start-ups and innovative digital finance providers; and 
(6) establish supportive infrastructure for the development of DFS especially credit 
information systems, information-sharing systems and information safety 
maintenance systems. Qualified digital finance providers will be given access to 
credit information databases and be allowed to apply for permits to conduct credit 
information businesses in accordance with relevant laws and regulations.            
At the same time, the Guideline reiterates the necessity to regulate and supervise DFS so as to 
ensure it develops in a healthy and sustainable way that serves the overall reforms and growth 
of China’s financial sector. The Guideline sets out a number of high-level regulatory 
approaches including clearly defining the boundaries and entry thresholds of different DFS, 
clarifying the division of responsibilities among regulatory authorities, controlling the 
potential risks associated with DFS, protecting the legitimate interests of digital finance 
providers and customers, and penalising illegal activities. Significantly, the Guideline 
clarifies that internet payment services, online lending services (including P2P lending and 
micro-loans), and online equity crowdfunding services, in principle, are to be limited to small 
value transactions. This finds support in a recent study showing that with respect to P2P 
lending, larger loan sizes are likely to lead to larger NPL sizes.
163
 Further, the businesses of 
online lending platforms should mainly focus on facilitating the exchange of information 
between borrowers and lenders, and must not include any type of credit information services 
or engage in illegal fundraising. Finally, a number of major obligations are imposed on online 
investment fund management platforms focusing on product and risk disclosure, risk and 
fund management, and consumer protection.            
With respect to the division of responsibilities between financial regulators, the Guideline 
officially confirms that the POBC is responsible for the regulation and supervision of internet 
payment services and the CBRC responsible for the regulation and supervision of online 
lending services. It further clarifies that the CSRC is to be responsible for regulating and 
supervising equity crowdfunding activities and online investment fund management services.  
In addition to the main financial regulators above, the other regulatory authorities and their 
responsibilities include: 
                                                          
163 See above n 98, Liu, “Internet Finance and Regulation in China”, at 28. 
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(1) telecommunication departments to administer the registration of websites of digital 
finance providers; 
(2) the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) to supervise 
telecommunication-related businesses involved in the provision of DFS; and  
(3) the State Council Internet Information Office to monitor and regulate all information 
related to DFS.   
Finally, for all types of digital finance, the Guideline sets forth a number of major areas of 
regulation and key regulatory propositions in each area that need to be further developed in 
the subsequent regulatory process, including: (1) the preservation and management of clients’ 
reserve funds; (2) product and risk disclosure and investor information disclosure; (3) the 
protection of consumers; (4) the protection of internet security and information safety; and (5) 
the prohibition of money laundering activities and financial crimes. At least two propositions 
are worth highlighting. First, it has been made a principle that clients’ funds received by 
payment institutions for payment services must be deposited with and managed by a banking 
institution. This serves to protect the safety of clients’ money in relation to all types of DFS. 
Second, the regulatory authorities will jointly develop technical safety standards for DFS. 
This suggests that such standards will become one of the entry thresholds for digital financial 
providers. 
In sum, while the Guideline merely sets out high-level principles for the development of DFS 
regulations, it has made clarifications on a number of important issues. First, DFS is not to be 
limited to the existing types of digital financial products (such as internet payment, online 
lending, crowdfunding, and online wealth management funds); rather, new forms of DFS are 
encouraged and welcome. Second, the boundaries of different types of DFS and the roles of 
different digital financial providers (such as banks, internet firms and e-commerce companies) 
are to be clearly defined. This will not only simplify the supervisory work of regulatory 
authorities, but will also contribute to the development of a systematic and disciplined digital 
finance market. Third, in principle DFS should be limited to small value transactions. This 
safeguards the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of digital finance on one hand, and avoids the 
larger risks associated with conducting larger transactions by digital means on the other hand. 
Fourth and as mentioned above, the Guideline has clarified the division of responsibilities 
between the relevant regulatory authorities. This will facilitate the coordination between the 
authorities in formulating DFS regulations, and in overseeing and supervising DFS activities 
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in practice. Lastly, the Guideline has laid down the main regulatory propositions providing 
clear guidance for the development of a comprehensive regulatory framework on DFS going 
forward.  
Following the release of the Guideline, regulatory activities have been emerging rapidly with 
several important and specific draft regulations or rules released within just one month. The 
most important include the consultation draft Rules on the Administration of Internet 
Payment Business by Non-Bank Payment Institutions
164
 issued by the PBOC on 31 July 2015 
and the consultation draft Regulation on Non-Depositing Loan Institutions
165
 issued by the 
State Council on 12 August 2015. With this momentum, a comprehensive regulatory 
framework for DFS by the end of the year would not surprise.  
6. Last Mover or First Mover? 
Almost four decades of economic reforms have brought China extraordinary, continuous 
development and growth. China’s financial sector reforms have progressed relatively more 
slowly due to state domination and control, amongst other factors. Consequently, while 
financial inclusion has long been relatively weak in China and its expansion one of the 
government’s policy priorities, it has been improved slowly. While traditional DFS (e.g. 
ATMs) have been growing since early in the reform era, more technology-oriented DFS (e.g. 
e-payment and internet banking) have not seen rapid growth until the last decade. It is only in 
the last decade that China has come to realise the significance of DFS to the improvement of 
financial inclusion and hence has started to promote the growth of DFS. Furthermore, the 
more innovative forms of DFS, such as P2P lending, crowdfunding, online investment fund 
management, and online micro loans, have been a recent phenomenon in China, mostly after 
2013. Thus, there is no doubt China has generally been a late mover in the development of 
DFS.  
China, however, has become one of the world’s largest DFS markets166 and among the most 
active of regulators of digital finance in a short period of time. Thanks to the supportive 
                                                          
164 Fei Yin Hang Zhi Fu Ji Gou Wang Luo Zhi Fu Ye Wu Guan Li Ban Fa (Zheng Qiu Yi Jian Gao), official Chinese version 
available at: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-07/31/content_2907209.htm   
165 Fei Cun Kuan Lei Fang Dai Zu Zhi Tiao Li (Zheng Qiu Yi Jian Gao), official Chinese version available at: 
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/cazjgg/201508/20150800478726.shtml  
166 See, for example, Shai Oster, “A Hundred Apps Bloom in China as Millions Bank on Their Phones”, 
BloombergBusiness (20 August 2015), available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-19/wechat-baidu-
and-alibaba-help-chinese-embrace-digital-banking  
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regulatory environment and technological advancement, financial institutions, non-financial 
institutions and other entities have all entered into DFS development to meet the rapidly 
growing needs of investors and consumers. With the explosive growth in almost every non-
traditional form of digital finance, China has overtaken many other earlier starters in DFS. 
The problems and risks associated with DFS have quickly emerged and the Chinese 
government has been determined to accelerate the establishment of a comprehensive 
regulatory framework to oversee and supervise DFS and ensure its healthy growth. While the 
regulations prior to 2015 are fragmented and inadequate, the publication of the 2015 DFS 
Guideline signals a strong political will to accomplish the regulatory work sooner rather than 
later with an expected deadline of the end of 2015. With this aggressive deadline is met or not, 
China will most likely become a front-runner worldwide in development of a sustainable, 
effective regulatory framework for DFS.                 
